1 Summary

Despite more than fifteen years of international effort, the situation in Afghanistan remains discouraging. Militant Islamist groups still have a foothold in parts of the country and the Taliban are stronger now than at any time since 2001. Ongoing hostilities continue to undermine the potential for economic and social development, threaten to reverse whatever progress has been achieved and weaken the opportunity to build a stable, functioning, democratic government. Political and social changes initiated externally have been supported by Afghan reformist groups, but have met resistance from conservative, religious and nationalist forces and various local powerbrokers.

Overall, Norway’s contribution did not make a significant difference to the international mission in Afghanistan. There were clear limits for what could be achieved in the situation, although there was some scope for independent action on Norway’s part. Norway pursued its own priorities to the extent that it could, but made little attempt to influence the approach of its allies.

The Norwegian government had three overarching objectives for its engagement in Afghanistan, presenting it as a battle fought together with the US and NATO, against international terror and for a better Afghanistan. The first and most important objective throughout was the Alliance dimension: to support the US and safeguard NATO’s continued relevance. Norway largely achieved the objective of confirming its role as a solid and reliable ally. The second objective was to support the international fight against terror by preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorist activities. The ‘war on terror’ was controversial and this objective was only partially achieved. The third objective was to help build a stable and democratic Afghan state through long-term development cooperation and peace diplomacy. This objective was not reached. Afghanistan’s formally democratic institutions are fragile and the war continues. International and Norwegian aid produced results in certain areas, such as health and education. However, Afghanistan has become one of the world’s most aid-dependent countries and the influx of aid has contributed to widespread corruption.

Three aspects of the engagement have stood out as most central to the Norwegian effort. The first of these, which was the largest and most high-profile aspect, was the involvement in Faryab province in northern Afghanistan. The second was the joint activities of the Norwegian special forces and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, whose engagement in Kabul beginning in 2007 was particularly important. The last aspect was an active pursuit by Norway of diplomatic efforts to promote a political solution to the conflict. Neither Norwegian attempts nor those of others to negotiate a settlement were successful, but Norway established contact with the Taliban at an early stage and influenced thinking in favour of a negotiated solution to the conflict. Both Norway’s peace diplomacy in this area and the activities of the Norwegian special forces and Intelligence Service played a particularly important role in strengthening Norwegian relations with the US.

Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan was challenging. It entailed great risk to deployed personnel, as well as extensive expenditure of civilian and military resources. Given the difficult circumstances, Norwegian civilian and military personnel performed well.

1.1 Policy frameworks and costs

The international military presence in Afghanistan from 2001 had a legal basis in the right of self-defence (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF), a mandate from the UN Security Council (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) and, subsequently, the consent of Afghan authorities. Legal issues relating to the classification of the conflict in its various phases, the use of military force against criminals and the treatment of prisoners have, however, been problematic. At times, there has been uncertainty as to which international legal frameworks were applicable.

The international effort, including Norway’s, to only a small degree incorporated an understanding of Afghanistan and local conditions, culture and patterns of conflict. State-building assisted by external actors – based on large-scale military activities, massive monetary transfers and weak local institutions – has proven very demanding. In Afghanistan, a society that by 2001 had already endured 23 years of war, it ultimately proved impossible.

The conflict and the international operation have been costly. The people of Afghanistan have suffered greatly. The number of civilians killed has increased year on year. Though there are no reliable figures for the human or monetary costs between 2001 and 2014, it is estimated that the number of people killed may exceed 90,000, including 3,496 international soldiers, over 23,000 Afghan military and police personnel, possibly 35,000 insurgents and nearly 30,000 Afghan and international civilians. The total related international military expenditure is estimated at more than USD 700 billion and international development aid at USD 57 billion.

The Norwegian contribution accounted for a very small proportion of the total resources spent and has correspondingly done little to change the country’s overall development since 2001. Over 9,000 Norwegian military personnel served in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Ten Norwegian soldiers lost their lives and many were seriously wounded. The Norwegian fatalities are named in Attachment 1. Norway spent roughly NOK 20 billion (USD 3.16 billion1) during this period, of which some NOK 11.5 billion (USD 1.83 billion) was for military purposes and NOK 8.4 billion (USD 1.33 billion) for civilian purposes. This amounted to approximately 0.26 per cent of the total international military expenditure and 2.3 per cent of the total official development assistance (ODA) contribution.

1.2 Three overarching objectives

The objectives and approaches employed in the Afghanistan operations have at times been internally inconsistent or contradictory. This helps to explain why objectives have only been partially achieved. Military considerations drove the agenda for state-building and development aid. The international coalition’s strategy for combatting terror and insurgency prioritised short-term security goals, which enabled local power structures that were corrupt and abusive to become further entrenched. Moreover, the extensive international military presence generated a sense of occupation among some segments of the Afghan population, thereby strengthening the very groups that the military forces were combatting. These conditions also had ramifications for Norway’s engagement.

As noted above, Norway had three overarching objectives for its activities in Afghanistan. These were achieved with varying degrees of success.

1.2.1 Relations with the US and NATO

The US has been the primary driving force in Afghanistan by virtue of its political weight and vast military and financial contributions. NATO as an organisation has not exercised active leadership, but the Alliance has played an important supportive role for the US in terms of force generation, has served as a forum for discussing strategy and has helped to confer international legitimacy on the operation. Overall, the various strategies and operational measures put forward by the US and NATO have not achieved the desired results on the ground.

The Norwegian military contribution did not influence the big picture in Afghanistan. The most important objective for Norway, however, was to maintain good relations with the US and help to ensure NATO’s relevance. In the autumn of 2001 there was broad-based political agreement in Norway to show solidarity with the US after the 11 September terror attacks. This domestic consensus lasted for the most part throughout the entire period until 2014. ‘In together, out together’ became the guiding principle for Norwegian efforts and, accordingly, the Norwegian military contributions were designed to demonstrate that Norway was a reliable and loyal ally. Decisions made by Norway to limit its role, such as not deploying to southern Afghanistan, did not have serious or lasting consequences for its relations with the coalition or its standing in NATO.

1.2.2 International coalition against terror

In addition to providing support to its most important ally, Norway decided early on to prioritise the US-led ‘war on terror’, which was triggered by the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. The government’s objectives were twofold: to participate in a combined international effort against a common threat and to defend its own national security.

The ‘war on terror’ quickly became controversial, however. The US intervention in Iraq in 2003, combined with repeated revelations about torture, abuse and violations of human rights in both Iraq and Afghanistan, provoked criticism, including in Norway. This was one reason why the second Bondevik Government chose to prioritise ISAF over OEF, and why the second Stoltenberg Government, which came to power in 2005, terminated Norway’s participation in OEF.

1.2.3 State-building and development

Similar to the contributions of other countries to Afghanistan, a primary objective behind Norway’s development assistance was to support the goal of building a democratic and, in the long term, well-functioning and economically independent Afghan state. ISAF’s role was to provide the security that would allow for state-building. Norwegian military efforts within ISAF must therefore also be seen as part of the state-building project.

In comparison to the situation in 2001, when much of Afghanistan lay in ruins after decades of civil war, by the end of 2014 the international and Norwegian contributions could point to some positive results, particularly in the areas of health and education. However, when compared to the stated ambition of achieving peaceful democratic development, the results were nevertheless disappointing, not least when considering the significant resources invested in the project. The war continued with growing intensity, threatening to undo the results achieved.

Norway focused on three priority areas in its development cooperation: education, governance and rural development. In addition, Norway emphasised cross-cutting issues such as women, peace and security, as well as corruption and human rights. Within the limits imposed by the situation, Norway was able to achieve some results. However, criticism relating to a lack of coordination and the inadequate building of capacity at the local level also applies to Norway, despite Norwegian efforts to promote Afghan ownership and better coordination in international development assistance.

Norway’s policy of a clear separation between civilian and military activities is, in principle, well founded in the desire to safeguard development aid projects from the armed conflict. This approach requires a high level of coordination, however, and the mechanisms for this were not adequately developed.

1.3 Three key areas

Three elements of Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan stand out: the effort in Faryab, special forces and intelligence, and peace diplomacy.

1.3.1 Faryab province

The Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab was Norway’s largest and most high-profile military contribution in Afghanistan. The province also received extensive Norwegian development assistance. The intention of the PRT model was to strengthen the Afghan central government’s control in the provinces and to promote state-building and development. This task proved difficult, if not impossible. Norway’s scope for independent action was limited, and what efforts they were able to make did not change the general developments in the province.

Norwegian authorities did not even manage to fully utilise the opportunities that did present themselves, although initiatives were taken at the local level. The Norwegian presence was insignificant, given the size of the province, and no cohesive Norwegian strategy was developed. It should be noted, however, that there were allies who invested greater resources in the other provinces and they were no more successful.

The Norwegian separation of civilian and military activities was not consistent with the strategy of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, which from 2008 guided ISAF’s approach to military and civilian cooperation. In the absence of clear guidelines, Norwegian PRT commanders were largely on their own in developing and conducting operations in Faryab. A training and mentoring project for local security forces was conducted, but it is uncertain how effective these efforts were. In general, however, the PRT model that became the ISAF instrument for stabilising the provinces did not measure up to expectations.

Many of the development projects appear to still be in place, particularly those with support from the local community. Their sustainability depends, however, on political developments and the security situation. Out of 117 Norwegian-funded schools in the province, the Commission has received information regarding 77. As of the spring of 2016, activity was registered at 68 schools, with a total of approximately 50,000 pupils, of which 30,000 are girls.

1.3.2 Special forces and the Intelligence Service

The Norwegian special forces and the Intelligence Service developed close cooperation in Afghanistan. Together they made important contributions to the fight against terror and towards state-building. Their efforts came to be highly valued by the US and NATO, and they thus proved to be an important security policy instrument. Special forces activities in Kabul from 2007 were particularly important. The special forces were able to carry out clearly defined missions that focused on safeguarding Kabul and building up the Afghan Crisis Response Unit 222 (CRU 222), which today shares responsibility for maintaining security in the city.

Cooperation in Afghanistan reinforced Norway’s cooperation with the US on intelligence, counter-terror and other special forces operations at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

1.3.3 Norwegian peace diplomacy

Norway’s engagement in peace diplomacy helped to put dialogue between the parties on the agenda and led to close contact with Afghan authorities and the US. This involvement thus also benefitted Norway’s foreign and national security policy. Over time, it became increasingly clear to many of the allies that a political solution to the conflict was necessary. By 2007 Norway had already begun paving the way for negotiations with the Taliban, in consultation with the Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Norway also actively worked towards influencing the internal processes in Washington until 2011, when the US first became open to the possibility of negotiating with the Taliban. Norway facilitated contact between the parties and conducted high-level meetings with the Taliban leadership, with a view to setting up Afghan peace talks.

Nonetheless, peace diplomacy yielded no concrete results. The motivations of the parties to the conflict and the countries in the region to either pursue armed offensives or seek negotiations changed over time in keeping with the evolving political dynamics in the region. There was little interest among coalition partners in negotiation in the early years when the Taliban were relatively weak. In later years, however, the desire for negotiation gained momentum as Taliban military capability and power increased. Though no breakthrough in peace negotiations resulted, Norwegian peace diplomacy nevertheless encouraged the idea of a negotiated peaceful settlement and established a network of contacts. Norway also participated in the Istanbul Protocol in an attempt to foster greater understanding between affected countries in the region.

1.4 Lessons learned

• As was the case in Afghanistan, future Norwegian involvement in conflict areas and fragile states will be conducted as part of international efforts in which others will set the overall framework. In principle Norway will always be free to choose not to take part. Such a choice may be difficult, however, when requests to participate come from NATO or the US, or when the UN asks for contributions towards enforcement measures as stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The trade-offs entailed in making a choice must be publicly acknowledged and communicated.

• Interventions involving regime change, as in Afghanistan, drain resources and can foster even more conflict. Successful state-building during ongoing armed conflict is near impossible to achieve. International state-building efforts must be based on inclusive political solutions.

• Attempts to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict must begin early. Norway has wide-ranging experience with such dialogue and is open to conducting talks with all parties. Norway therefore has a special responsibility to take the initiative in promoting negotiations.

• The current system of closed-door briefings for the Enlarged Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and broad, open reports to the Storting (Norwegian parliament) should be improved. Whenever Norway engages in a conflict area, the government should inform the Storting more systematically of the intended objectives, means, anticipated results and experience as it goes along. Institutionalising such procedures will also provide a better foundation for an informed debate.

• Norwegian authorities must improve mechanisms for coordinating Norwegian activities in operations in conflict areas and fragile states. It is essential to establish a high-level coordination unit with responsibility for developing strategies and action plans, which must be approved at the political level. The activities of the coordination unit must have a greater strategic focus than was the case under the State Secretary Committee for Afghanistan. The unit must engage in a dialogue with relevant partners.

• Norway should not assume responsibility for integrated activities (state-building, development and security) on a large scale. Norway should instead be developing specialised expertise in areas where long-term needs are identified and clear roles are stipulated, within the framework of broader international, unified efforts.

• The Ministry of Defence and armed forces leadership must take an active role in formulating the mission to be carried out by Norwegian military commanders in international operations. This is particularly important in situations where the Norwegian approach deviates from guidelines in the international operation.

• The quality and impact of Norwegian development aid, as well as the administrative capacity required for effectively delivering it, must be given greater attention than is currently the case. The experience of Afghanistan indicates that a large volume of aid should not be an end in itself.

In Chapter 14 the Commission presents a number of further lessons learned.