3 Overall assessment of the recommendations1
In this report, the committee has primarily been concerned with finding measures that reduce the overall risk of a serious incident with cruise ships. It is not possible to dimension an emergency preparedness and response system that takes into account an accident involving a cruise ship with several thousand passengers on board. This applies not only to the evacuation of people from the ship, but also the further handling of a high number of seriously injured people. The committee has therefore emphasised probability-reducing measures to reduce the risk of cruise traffic. The consequence-reducing recommendations do not entail a significant increase in emergency preparedness, but are aimed at quality improvements of existing emergency preparedness and handling where practical.
The recommendations balance the consideration for maritime safety and emergency preparedness against the cruise industry’s need for a predictable and viable framework.
On behalf of the committee, DNV and Menon Economics have carried out a socio-economic analysis of some of the committee’s recommendations. Priority was given to analysing measures that are assumed to be most intrusive or to have high investment costs, including the committee’s recommendation on traffic restrictions. The result of the socio-economic analysis can to a certain extent be used to prioritise risk-reducing measures. In addition to the fact that the analysis has only been carried out for some of the committee’s recommendations, it also has its limitations.
The socio-economic analysis shows that the introduction of a number of measures has low benefits, but also low costs. In such cases with low costs and low overall benefit, there may still be good arguments for implementing measures based on the precautionary principle. This is also in line with the ALARP principle of implementing risk-reducing measures when the costs of these are not disproportionately high.
The committee emphasises that the socio-economic costs of the recommendations are relatively small compared with the enormous costs that can arise if an accident should occur with a cruise ship. The costs of a major accident involving cruise ships are estimated at between 14 and 85 billion Norwegian kroner, and not all the costs associated with the rescue operation are included.
The Cruise Committee has not ranked its recommendations by priority, but emphasises that probability-reducing measures will be the most effective in reducing risk. Priorities will to a large extent also depend on political assessments, where a holistic approach to the cruise industry will be key. An overall overview of all the committee’s recommendations is listed in the table below.
Table 3.1 List of the committee’s recommendations
No. | Recommendations | Discussed in chapter |
|---|---|---|
Holistic approach to the cruise industry | ||
1. | The Norwegian authorities must prepare a comprehensive national plan for cruise traffic in which safety, emergency preparedness and rescue play a central role. The plan should be part of the Governments’ national tourism plan. | 8.1 |
2. | The Government should consider establishing an inter-ministerial committee for tourism that integrates safety, emergency preparedness and rescue related to cruise traffic. | 8.1 |
3. | The Government should consider whether the Norwegian authorities are appropriately organised to deal with the cruise industry in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. | 8.1 |
4. | As a shipping nation, Norway should play a leading role in strengthening international regulation of cruise traffic with respect to maritime safety, emergency preparedness and rescue. | 8.1 |
Cooperation between authorities and the cruise industry | ||
5. | The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries should establish a formalised cooperation between the relevant authorities and the cruise industry. | 8.2 |
6. | The Ministry of Justice and Public Security should establish an exercise group consisting of relevant authorities and the cruise industry, which will be mandated to assess and propose measures for the overall exercise activities for cruise traffic. | 8.2 |
Traffic regulations | ||
7. | On ships over 150 metres, the Norwegian authorities should impose traffic restrictions under given weather conditions, in given time periods, within more defined areas, or a combination of these. | 8.3 |
8. | The Norwegian authorities should introduce a limit of 500–750 people on board cruise ships sailing in the territorial waters of Svalbard (majority proposal). | 8.3 |
9. | Norway must take the initiative for international regulation of cruise traffic towards the North Pole. | 8.3 |
Access to data and information | ||
10. | The Norwegian Mapping Authority’s capacity for work on nautical mapping and nautical chart production must be strengthened. | 8.4 |
11. | The Norwegian authorities must ensure the rapid implementation of new regulations on the recording and use of information concerning certain specified seabed conditions. | 8.4 |
12. | The Meteorological Institute must prepare ice maps every day of the week. | 8.4 |
13. | The Norwegian authorities should ensure that official information to the cruise industry is on a single website or download service. | 8.4 |
Communication systems | ||
14. | The Norwegian authorities should actively take advantage of the opportunities provided by the satellite-based broadband development in the High North to provide new practical services within maritime safety, emergency preparedness and rescue. | 8.5 |
15. | The Norwegian Coastal Administration should consider whether it is possible to use the AIS base stations under establishment in Svalbard as a platform for a VHF emergency message service for the archipelago. | 8.5 |
16. | The Government should provide the necessary aeronautical communications coverage for the entire country. | 8.5 |
Training and competence on board | ||
17. | The Norwegian authorities should require that all deck and engineer officers on passenger ships operating in Svalbard shall have basic qualifications and adapted courses based on the Polar Code. | 8.6 |
18. | In cooperation with the cruise industry, the Norwegian authorities should develop requirements that ensure that masters and duty officers on passenger ships with more than 100 passengers that sail during the winter season along the mainland coast, shall have basic qualifications and adapted courses based on the Polar Code. | 8.6 |
19. | In cooperation with the cruise industry, the Norwegian authorities should establish requirements that the safety crew and other employees on board who play a key role in connection with evacuation from passenger ships operating in Svalbard, shall have a supplementary course in passenger and crisis management with a focus on the challenges in polar waters. | 8.6 |
20. | Norway must be a driving force in raising the qualification requirements in the regulations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). | 8.6 |
21. | The Norwegian authorities should facilitate that shipping companies operating in areas with limited rescue capacity are offered courses and training in leading rescue operations at sea, so-called on-scene coordinator courses. | 8.6 |
Research and development | ||
22. | The funding of research, development and innovation in the prevention, emergency preparedness and response of undesirable incidents with cruise ships must be bolstered. | 8.7 |
23. | The cruise industry should increase its commitment and contribute more to research, development and innovation projects that can improve maritime safety. | 8.7 |
Risk assessment | ||
24. | The Norwegian authorities should develop a guide for risk assessment for the industry, where challenges with winter cruises are discussed separately. | 9.1 |
Voyage planning | ||
25. | Norway should work to update the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) guidelines for voyage planning. | 9.2 |
26. | The Norwegian Coastal Administration should establish more reference routes for cruise ships along the coast. | 9.2 |
Search and rescue (SAR) cooperation plans | ||
27. | The Norwegian authorities should consider making the requirement in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) for SAR cooperation plans applicable to passenger ships that are not certified for international travel, and which operate in Norwegian territorial waters. | 9.3 |
28. | Norway should work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to achieve a more appropriate requirement for exercises so that SAR cooperation plans are also practiced frequently enough in the Norwegian rescue responsibility area. | 9.3 |
29. | Norway should work to ensure that the international register for SAR cooperation plans is up-to-date and downloadable for rescue centres. | 9.3 |
30. | The Norwegian Maritime Authority should increase its focus on SAR cooperation plans in connection with port state controls, in order to map their status and enforce the requirement for this. | 9.3 |
The ship’s technical safety and certificates | ||
31. | Norway should work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to introduce a requirement for an operational assessment in connection with the certification of all passenger ships, similar to those for ships certified according to the Polar Code. | 9.4 |
32. | Norway should work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to introduce requirements for redundant propulsion machinery for larger passenger ships, as well as requirements for a safe operating mode when the ships operate in coastal waters. | 9.4 |
33. | The Norwegian authorities should consider incentives that reward shipping companies that operate ships with documentable redundancy in the propulsion machinery. | 9.4 |
Towing equipment | ||
34. | The cruise industry and the relevant authorities must carry out several emergency towing exercises with cruise vessels. | 9.5 |
35. | Norway should work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to introduce international requirements for towing equipment on board all cruise ships. | 9.5 |
36. | Various solutions for emergency towing should be explored in more detail, including shore-based depots and national requirements. | 9.5 |
Rescue equipment | ||
37. | Norway should actively participate in the work of establishing an objective- and function-based rescue chapter in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). | 9.6 |
38. | Norway should work to make the preliminary guidelines for the Polar Code on life-saving appliances and arrangements mandatory, as well as to establish an international standard for calculating the maximum expected rescue time. | 9.6 |
39. | The Norwegian authorities should stimulate research and innovation with regard to life-saving appliances, and in particular the extent to which lifeboats for passenger ships can be used under different conditions. | 9.6 |
40. | The cruise industry should ensure that new and safer technology for lifeboats and other life-saving appliances is used. | 9.6 |
Traffic monitoring and reporting | ||
41. | The Norwegian authorities should require cruise ships to immediately report any changes that may affect the ship’s automatic position reporting or operational capability. | 10.1 |
42. | The Norwegian authorities should prioritise the work of automating several of the processes related to monitoring and reporting of cruise traffic. | 10.1 |
43. | The Norwegian authorities should strengthen the Norwegian Vessel Traffic Service through expansions of service areas and the establishment of new ones. | 10.1 |
44. | The Norwegian authorities should mandate that all vessels carrying passengers must have an automatic identification system (AIS) in operation on board. | 10.1 |
Resource allocation | ||
45. | The Norwegian Coastal Administration should further develop the Shared Resources Register so that emergency preparedness capacities for cruise ships are more evident than today. | 11.1 |
46. | The Norwegian Coastal Administration should ensure that towing resources are registered in the Shared Resources Register. | 11.1 |
47. | The Norwegian Coastal Administration should develop the functionality of the Tracking and Interaction service so that more actors taking part in an emergency response or search and rescue incident can be given access. | 11.1 |
48. | The Ministry of Justice and Public Security should discuss whether the geographical coverage and the operational application of Rescue Efforts at Sea (RITS) is good enough. | 11.1 |
49. | The Ministry of Justice and Public Security should ensure that the Norwegian Civil Defence is given the opportunity and resources to provide assistance in Svalbard in the event of serious civilian incidents in the archipelago. | 11.1 |
Communication during incidents | ||
50. | The Norwegian authorities should explore common digital communication platforms including in the event of incidents at sea. | 11.2 |
51. | The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre’s and Avinor’s1 work on the concept for air coordination should be intensified. | 11.2 |
Handling on board | ||
52. | The Norwegian authorities should, in cooperation with the cruise industry, explore a technological solution for passenger lists and lists of evacuees. | 11.3 |
53. | The Norwegian authorities should consider stricter requirements for medical treatment capacity on board large cruise ships. | 11.3 |
Mass rescue operations | ||
54. | The Norwegian authorities should encourage the cruise industry to partner with other vessels on sailing in close enough proximity in order to come to each other’s aid in areas with a long response time for rescue resources. | 11.4 |
55. | The Norwegian authorities should ensure that mass rescue exercises are regularly held along the mainland coast, in which cruise ships also participate as a resource. | 11.4 |
56. | The Norwegian authorities must ensure efficient fuel supply to aircraft in the event of mass rescue operations connected with cruise ship incidents. | 11.4 |
57. | The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and local rescue centres should utilise the potential of the rescue managements in planning the handling of communication and information during mass rescue operations. | 11.4 |
58. | The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre should be given increased resources to handle the massive communication and information sharing required for mass rescue operations. | 11.4 |
59. | The Norwegian authorities must prioritise the work of putting in place practical solutions for the emergency preparedness stockpile situation in Longyearbyen. | 11.4 |
60. | Airdrops of emergency aid packages should be further developed by strengthening the existing solution in Svalbard. | 11.4 |
Reception on shore | ||
61. | Coastal municipalities should incorporate undesirable incidents with cruise ships into their risk and vulnerability analyses. | 11.5 |
62. | Coastal municipalities should put in place inter-municipal agreements on mutual aid during an incident with cruise ships. | 11.5 |
63. | The Ministry of Justice and Public Security should prepare plans for handling cruise incidents on shore, and ensure coordination and exercising of the plans among various emergency preparedness actors. | 11.5 |
64. | The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries should discuss whether the Shared Resources Register can be expanded to cover the need for a digital action support system. | 11.5 |
Collaborative exercises | ||
65. | The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre should be enabled to exercise its responsibility as a driving force for collaboration and hold regular rescue exercises with cruise ships at the national, regional and local level. | 12.1 |
Evaluation of exercises and incidents | ||
66. | The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre should be provided with resources to analyse experiences from sea rescue operations and exercises. | 12.2 |
1 Avinor is a wholly-owned state limited company under the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications and is responsible for state-owned airports.
Footnotes
Originally Chapter 14 of NOU 2022: 1 Cruise traffic in Norwegian waters and adjacent sea areas – Maritime safety, emergency preparedness and rescue